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Language, Place and Learning

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by Joe Lo Bianco, University of Melbourne

The Andrews’ Place

The front cover of Anna Wierzbicka’s 2006 book *English: Meaning and Culture*, published by Oxford University Press, reproduces Thomas Gainsborough’s famous painting, *Mr and Mrs Andrews*. The genteel Suffolk couple are pictured at the left of the (apparently unfinished) painting. The couple are dressed up to the nines against a scene of rustic fecundity; sheaves of corn to their side and gentle hills in the background.

Mr Andrews dons a tri-corn hat and exudes satisfaction as he leans relaxed against an elegant outdoor bench-seat, a hunting rifle unthreateningly facing down though the crook of his right arm. Mrs Andrews is seated, both rigid and demure, at his left, her acid blue hooped skirt and silk shoes suggesting ballroom rather than working farm. Her hands are folded on her lap, probably intended to hold a baby, or perhaps the bird Mr Andrews might have intended to shoot. The incongruity between prim attire and lands that need working suggests ownership rather than cultivation; the posture, silence, dress and demeanour offer a clear counterpoint to the fertile and cultivated lands. This is a display of association, ownership and prosperity, a rural idyll of cultural continuity between lands and Andrews’s, 18th century English people and English place. It is a lesson in manners; the tart characters seem not so much to belong to the place, as to tell us that it belongs to them.

Just like Gainsborough, Wierzbicka tells us that lands and people, through language, continue to belong together. Her work is about how the Anglo in English persists despite being spoken now more often by people called Peng and Rajiv to people called Takahashi, ibn Wahid and Santi-Biondi. English is the enduring carrier of the painting’s classic Englishness. Wierzbicka’s systematic and careful methodology of cultural semantics uncovers cultural scripts, so that the English, those people, and the England, that place, continue these centuries later in English, the language. It is a curious sidelight that critics sometimes describe this kind of painting as a “conversation piece”. This is ironic because the conversations would have been boasting about ownership of such prized works of art, when the painting itself depicts profound silence; a self-assured, even smug, kind of silence that does not need words.

In Wierzbicka’s analysis the mental and cultural worlds of Mr and Mrs Andrews are exposed in their English and how they use it. She detects the influences of puritans, enlightenment thinking about reason and individualism, and notes that these percolate into everyday discourse from their origins in philosophy, religion and social conditions. According to this approach the particularly English way of using words *like fair, right and wrong* suggest a “procedural morality” and widespread use of epistemic phrases like *I think, I consider, I suspect, I imagine, I suppose* etc) and epistemic adverbs like *evidently, arguably, presumably, advisedly, probably* distil into ordinary conversation the social ideologies of dominant philosophical schools of English liberalism. The kind, presumably, that Mr and Mrs Andrews might have used and that a great
deal of English academic writing, policy making and educational practice embody today. In this way history continues, through grammar and forms of conversation, so that the present carries the past into the future, though talk and writing. In effect, English is bonding social capital for Mr and Mrs Andrews. This is a distinctive feature of languages that reflects and forms identity. Languages commonly play a part in nationalist mobilisation for statehood and are sometimes the chief vehicle in agitation for autonomous statehood.

The painting, therefore, is an ideal illustration for the book. Mr and Mrs Andrews embodies English: Meaning and Culture. Both deal with idealisations and cultural essence, not only the management of place but its infusion with ideology and cultural meaning. English: Meaning and Culture is an interesting contribution to how we think about language and place. Wierzbicka is an important scholar who uses a disciplined methodology to uncover the persistence of culture in communication, and succeeds in giving credence to claims people have always made about language: that language carries and reflects culture, that it carries and reflects time, that it is linked to place and context in lasting ways. For English today, the world’s language, lingua mundi, used in places far away from Suffolk and in the mouths of people totally unlike the Andrews, this claim has profound, and controversial, consequences.

Today English is a key medium of higher education in Stockholm and Kuala Lumpur. It is the language that lubricates global capital and its movement as well as processes of globalisation and their spread. English remains dominant in information and communications technologies, with most of the basic semantics and operating systems derivative of English. German and Japanese scientists, and the French, publish science and conduct much of their academic discourse through English. While some former British colonies evicted English from their primary education systems many have since re-introduced it. During primary education in Shanghai, a city and a region never subject to British colonial rule, English is not only taught as a subject but used to teach many subjects in more and more schools every year. In this context to claim that Anglo culture (Wierzbicka prefers not to call it ideology) persists stubbornly inside English is a claim with considerable practical, not to say cultural and political, repercussions.

More Chinese learners of English than Americans

It has been said by sociolinguists and language educators that there are more Chinese learning English than there are Americans (Lo Bianco, 2007). David Graddol’s 2006 assessment of the state of English today, contained in a report for the British Council published in 2006 under the title English Next, goes further. Graddol’s calculations show that some two billion people, or about one third of all people, will know or be learning English sometime between 2010 and 2015 and that as many as three billion people, half of today’s total world population, could soon speak some kind of English.

In Graddol’s estimation this suggests that English is actually ceasing to be a foreign language at all, a language one might study to get to know the world of Mr and Mrs Andrews, their society and descendents, and is becoming instead a “basic skill” (Lo Bianco, 2005a). Is it realistic to expect that English, whose very name suggests a specific place and a particular people, can cease to be foreign to all these people? Can any language, and here English, even cease to be a language at all? This is what is implied in the evidence Graddol reports of how people treat English in many Asian countries. To cease being foreign, and more extremely, to be constituted
as a *basic skill*, suggests any one of three possibilities. First, that English is able to transcend place and setting. Second, that it has travelled and become local in its new settings. Third, and is this merely an elaboration of the second possibility, that it is able to multiply the number of places and settings to which it belongs and is seen to belong. While some of these possibilities are theoretically true for any language, and actually true to some extent for a small group of international languages, they are either deeply true of English or English is special in some respects.

It is ironic that it is largely due to Americans that English has attained these extraordinary achievements. After all, for almost two centuries Americans struggled to change the language they inherited from Britain. There were attempts to invent a new language for the new republic, one based on a fusion of English and German. There were attempts to re-name English *American* and along with the name change to reform its inherited aristocratic character, rejecting, in essence, the Anglo in the English and infusing American culture/ideology into a form of English to be called American. There were other attempts, some serious, some crackpot, to adopt Hebrew, Greek, or French. One apparently proposed that the Americans retain English but force the British to learn Greek (Baron, 1987, 1990), but all of them indicate that Americans imagined that language would need to change in the wake of the War of Independence in 1776.

In these post-independence moves to mark the United States as different from monarchical Britain, many wanted a uniquely American way to talk and write, one that might also reward the loyalty of the large non-British components of the population, such as the Germans and Dutch. Several aimed to modify all existing natural European languages in American and produce a ‘politically correct’ Germanic English. To this end some language inventors set to work writing grammars, readers and vocabulary lists that biased English towards its German origins. In this way they linked grammar to ideology, all the while pushing for a democratic language ethos as well.

Several attempts were made in Congress and some State legislatures to rule on language issues. Probably the first official move was Washington J. McCormick’s failed 1923 Congressional proposal to declare ‘American’ the official language. McCormick’s explicit aim was to free American thought “to supplement the political emancipation of 76 by the mental emancipation of 23” (McCormick 1923: 41). McCormick’s might have Mr and Mrs Andrews in mind with his pictorial prose: “Let our writers drop their top-coats, spats, and swagger-sticks, and assume occasionally their buckskin, mocassins and tomahawks” the clothes suggesting a different relationship of person to place, from the aristocratic idleness of observing pastoral cultivation that Gainsborough depicts to the active tomahawking of the New World. In 1923 a similar bill was actually adopted in the Illinois State House. Here a Senator Frank Ryan succeeded in having ‘American’ declared official in that state, in a move expressed with “virulently anti-British” sentiment (Baron 1987/1992:39); a provision which remained law until changed to ‘English’ in 1969.

Apart from language names, or languages, there was concern with language style and eloquence, and in particular with what kind of political community different styles of language use would support. In 1780 the American patriot John Adams urged the first Congress of the new Republic to bolster”.... liberty, prosperity, and glory” by devoting “...an early attention to the
subject of eloquence and language”. He was concerned to defend eloquence and the role of eloquence in democratic life because “the form of government has an influence upon language” and that language in its turn influences government and what he called the temper, sentiments and manners of “the people”. For Adams the American states were “so democratical” that eloquence itself would become crucial in public life, anticipating that English would come to be the world’s dominant language instead of the then fading Latin and emergent French (Adams, 1780). Nine years later Noah Webster issued a Declaration of Linguistic Independence in which he called for Americans to ‘adorn’ English and use it well but also for the separation of ‘American’ from ‘English’, believing it to be both “necessary and inevitable” (Webster, 1789).

In these ways English was to be dressed up for serving a republic that had broken away, to be given a new and different cultural essence. These early American patriots were in no doubt that America’s anti-monarchical republicanism, and its individualistic and capitalistic democracy, deserved a new language and/or it would give birth to a more appropriate kind of English, worthy of being called American, shorn of deference and aristocratic privilege in its forms of address and reference, direct and immediate rather than class-based and tied to the ‘Order of the Garter’, affectations of monarchism and tired ‘old-world’ ways.

As Adams predicted, English has come to dominate over other lingua francas throughout the world. It dominates because of an historical contingency arising from the mercantile and colonial expansion of the British Empire which was followed by American economic and technological hegemony (Eco 1997: 331). This sequence is unprecedented in history where political empires and the “empires of the word” (Ostler, 2003) have always involved major disruptions to established order and there is no reason to assume, despite the immense spread and power of English, that it won’t come under challenge, as many people are predicting Chinese will do (Lo Bianco, 2007). This stretching of English beyond its corner of Europe has intensified a deep, and possibly unresolvable, dispute about the relation between language and nationality, identity and belonging, and the connection of these with education - and politics.

Stretching English

This English is a very stretched language, pushing the idea of connection between talk and place, people and place, very wide and far, more than any linguistic medium.

A recent book that takes a polar opposite approach to Wierzbicka’s is Adrian Holliday’s The Struggle to Teach English as an International Language which is devoted precisely to replacing Anglo-centredness. Holliday’s approach to English, and especially to its teaching, stresses a different kind of social capital, though neither he nor Wierzbicka use this term. In Wierzbicka’s research she identifies a density of references, from the past to the present, from philosophy and culture to ordinary conversation, and so English forms a kind of internal bonding social capital. Holliday stresses, or rather assumes, a bridging social capital and attributes this to English. Where Wierzbicka sees the Anglo, Holliday sees the multiple; in his work there are many peoples, many places and many Englishes, and the idea that the language might “reflect” its originating culture would be regarded as cultural essentialism. Instead, Holliday is concerned with “the changing ownership of English” in a work not of semantics but of “critical sociology” (2005: p ix). His explicit aim is to remove “power and privilege—from an English-speaking West
which has dominated the TESOL world with its well-resourced institutions of teaching, training and publishing and the residues of a colonial past” (2005: ix).

It is clear from how this reads how much in the distant past he regards the Andrews, of no ongoing relevance to the main problems and issues facing the learning and teaching of English, and learning and teaching through English.

It isn’t ultimately clear what view Holliday would offer in relation to English and place, or whether he imagines it to be place-less; instead he assumes that English can have any place, possibly even all places, and is only held back by what he calls ‘native speakerism’. Wierzbicka also acknowledges that it is possible to use English in ways that ‘nativise’ it, so that new cultural forms govern the practice of communication; but she regards it as both naïve and untrue to imagine that English can be had without its formative cultural inheritance. Holliday’s reasoning is essentially anti-imperialist, he wants to remove the native speaker from its position of domination and might be appalled by how close to the very sinews of language Wierzbicka thinks the native speaker actually is. Native speakerism, and native speakerist assumptions, are the precise targets for Holliday, not describing them, or exposing the fact that they lurk within the lexemes, morphology, syntax and modes of communication of English, but ejecting them from the organisation, delivery and management of TESOL programs, reducing their hold on textbook writing, materials development, professional upgrading courses, credentialing institutions and assessment and testing regimes.

The ownership of English isn’t of course legal: in that sense no one could own English. The ownership that anti-native speakerist politics is contesting is cultural capital and its attendant economic resources in the teaching of English as an international language. A big target of Holliday’s criticism is the relative power of local (“periphery”) educators compared to cultural offspring of Mr and Mrs Andrews, perhaps even descended directly from that missing baby, who have gone forth into the world following English’s fortunes, and perhaps some of their own as well. These from “the English-speaking West”, the “ESOL educators”, are the major target of this work.

Imperialism with and in language

In the early 1990s Robert Phillipson ignited a still lively debate about English in the world. In one work entitled English Language Teaching and Imperialism published by Cambridge University Press in 1991 and a second in 1992 entitled Linguistic Imperialism published this time by Oxford University Press, Phillipson took aim at the effects and intentions of agencies promoting English throughout the world, concerned less with teaching practices and more with political, cultural and ideological issues arising from the spread of English worldwide. Even writers who distance themselves from Phillipson’s work still need to pay attention to his claims and so his ideas, as we see in Holliday’s book, still resonate.

Phillipson’s controversial claim was that English is not merely spreading, but spreading in a motivated way and that this constitutes a linguistic variant of imperial power and domination of first world interests over those of developing nations seeking independent cultural development and identity. The ideas animated a contest about what constitutes ‘imperialism’ in language and about the ‘complicity’ of the English language teaching profession, British and American cultural
agencies, academic researchers and advanced country language planners. More subtly, this raises questions about the role of language in social life (emblem of identity, forger of bonds, shaper of ideas, means of communication etc) as well as issues of cultural authenticity, multilingualism and issues of place and belonging.

An important principle of socio-linguistics dictates that no community requires two languages to do the exact same things, and so if the biggest languages spread and occupy communicative space previously held by other languages these become restricted (Mühlhäusler, 1995). Some languages retreat, others fight back, others are supported by cultural agencies or language laws, while many tiny languages are constricted and their speakers transfer to using another form and so tiny languages die (Diamond, 2001). The metaphors used to characterise languages and their ecological relations often deploy notions of ‘death’, ‘extinction’, ‘murder’ and ‘suicide’ because languages are intimately connected with humans, our cultures, and our environment (Nettle and Romaine, 2000: 6).

The physical places, the locations, of the main institutions of global capital and its reasoning systems reflect the language in which they operate. The Washington Consensus is Henderson’s (1999) description of the logic of global market economics, which links aid, trade and banking but also the US capital. The institutions that spread the American hegemony are English placed, as it were, just like the French language strategy in Europe pressing for the location of key institutions in francophone cities (Phillipson, 2003).

Here it is clear that people do not imagine language as a neutral, ideology- or values-free mechanism for conveying messages. If this were the case we would all settle on the most efficient instrument for information exchange and adopt it. Language surfaces complex and deep-seated interests of culture and ideology, and the interests of national states. Languages serve pragmatic functions in states, usually functions of administration and education, credentialing and certifying. In the build-up to politics to form states based on nationality or ethnicity, language is often a central claim.

**National states and languages: the ultimate social capital**

If a coherent group speaking a common language exists in a reasonably coherent geographic space the prospects that it will seek either autonomy or independence for its governance is high (though the majority of “nationalities” in the world do not have separate states). In Hroch’s (1996) examination of national agitation there happens an early stage often that has no self-conscious national purpose, it might simply be archival, or folkloristic. In a later moment elites convert this into grievance and agitation while in a final phase it can become a mass activity when linked to wider claims for emancipation. If statehood or some kind of devolved power is achieved the function of the language changes radically. It is no longer mostly required to persuade the group that it belongs together (though to some extent this need continues), now the language is used to produce internal unity (often at the expense of minorities), and also to administer and manage the new geo-political entity.

Here the literate form of the language comes to the fore. Mass literacy is indispensable to the operations of a state, to running its education, military, communications and media, and other systems of vertical administration, defence, education and control. In East Asian settings, for
example, the vast bulk of language planning and aspects of national unity and identity are closely tied to script and orthography (Gottlieb and Chen, 2001). National prestige, or defence, often involves securing borders, or expanding interests, and security too is dependent on the operations of efficient systems of literate communication. Under recent economically based globalisation (Held, et al, 1999) these interests have to be pooled, or negotiated, or sublimated to rules that transcend or at least modify national ones, even the extended history of globalisation (Hopkins, 2002). This process too requires language, but also a choice from among the available dialectal forms to facilitate communication, and therefore some languages come to have prevailing power. Over time the habitual use of lingua francas creates local groups of attachment to the language of wider communication, and post-colonial power relations also favour colonial and therefore international languages. Many languages have shared this experience, and within national states most national languages have been used to marginalise, or even exterminate, minority communities of communication (Wright, 2000).

These connections to language have been fundamental in the creation of many national states today, with distinctive languages functioning as fuel for nationalist mobilisation. However, we tend to imagine that the monolingual inspired national states that this has produced have always been there (Maffi, 2001). This is a kind of thinking called presentism. In reality though, before the national state with its monolingual assumptions about distinctive populations united by shared history, language and identity, states were often much more diverse linguistically. The pre-national state tended to be dynastic in its politics and trans-national in its form. Feudal Europe is an excellent example (Hastings, 1997; Greenfeld, 1992). An elite cross-national language, Latin, afforded mobility, exchange and literate progress for elites. Rulers were also connected horizontally across the wider European space according to alliance and marriage, while Church unity afforded a transcendent order of unity. However, at the local level there was mass linguistic and cultural diversity.

Three things interrupted this. The replacement of Latin by vernacular languages that were then given national status meant that local languages had competition from above (Lo Bianco, 2005b). The second was the rise of the national state. Forming states on the basis of nationality required “communion” between rulers and ruled, vertical cultural connections, and therefore homogenisation (Hastings, 1997). This resulted in the politics of elimination or consolidation of language within states. In the French case this was bolstered by the ideals of the Revolution which insisted on notions of equality of citizenship as all important (Wright, 2000). The third, and decisive, factor was the communication needs of industrialisation. Needing educated workforces, in standardised written national languages, led to the creation of compulsory education. Delivered monolingually, this mass literacy supported the other efforts of national states to make their internal populations more homogeneous.

The overall result was that Europe today has only about 3% of the some 6,700 spoken languages of the world; fewer than a small country like Papua New Guinea alone (Mühlhäuser 1995; Nettle and Romaine, 2000; Maffi, 2001).

Once states had been forged as unified entities around the idea that the citizens would be culturally and therefore linguistically similar, language served crucial functions of unification, efficiency and administration. Whether more or less severe, more or less overt, most national
states aimed to remove difference and homogenise cultures, assimilating indigenous, regional, or newly admitted populations.

Languages also served pragmatic operations of census taking, military service, administration and government. Industrialisation required more precise quantification and standardisation than spoken vernaculars could supply and so more and more prestige, and reward, and investment was made in selected codes, national dialects, which came to be called national languages rather than dialects. These in turn became the vehicles of intellectualisation, and codification, so that over time the advantage became more advantageous. Internal minorities might have persisted in national states, and today many are reviving, but new admissions to the state, children or immigrants, were socialised in the standard national language form.

**Tongue-Cutting Language Tests: Exposing Poseurs**

As examples of how the social capital of belonging has been forged via language, consider the language test. At the sharp end, literally, is a whole class of practical applications of belonging, called the Shibboleth Tests in recognition of their original mention in the Book of Judges in the Bible.

These tests were designed to be the ultimate guarantee that defeated enemies would be exposed if they tried to pose as belonging to the victorious parties. One key test was the application of a phonology challenge, asked to say a word containing consonant sounds known to expose the speaker as belonging to an outside group. Failure often resulted in execution, or torture, or expulsion, or some other dire consequence.

Shibboleth tests are not rare, nor are they culturally or geographically specialised. Apart from their presence in the Book of Judges in the Bible (Spolsky, 1995) where the word shibboleth itself was the test and whose mispronunciation resulted in death at the hands of the victors, McNamara and Roever (2006, 150 - 155) report a shibboleth test being used by English against Danes in 1002, by Arab Yemenis against non-Arab African slaves in Yemen in 1060, by the English against Flemings in England in 1381, by Mamluks against Arabs in Egypt in 1302, by Japanese against Koreans in Japan in 1923, by Sicilians against their Norman overlords in 1282, by Frisians against non-Frisians sailing into their territorial waters, by Sinhalese against Tamils in Colombo in 1983 (also Rajasingham-Senanayke,1998) by Spanish speaking Dominicans against French and Kreyol Haitians in 1937, and in Lebanon between Christian and Palestinians during the 1990s. There were many instances during the Second World War, both in Europe and in the Pacific, by Americans against Japanese trying to pass as Chinese (say “lollapalooza!”) and by Botswanans to expose Zimbabweans working illegally in their country.

The words concerned are usually mundane: parsely, bucket, tomato, “Chichester Church”, *ciciri* (chickpeas), *jyugoen gojyussen* (15 yen 50 sen). The only criterion is that they need to contain some feature that will characteristically betray one group of users’ membership of an out-group. Tongue-twisters have also been used. There is no meaning or significance in the term, or word, or phrase, or expression other than that some aspect of its vocalisation exposes the cultural, religious, political, ethnic identities of the speakers.
As McNamara and Roever (2006) show, these tests are only the extreme of what are now institutionalised practices, sanctioned by science and regimes of validity, for determining unwanted outsiders (the untrustworthy, the undocumented alien, the under-qualified, the marginalised, the excluded etc) so that surveillance assumes scientific status and operates to cleanse place and institution of the non-admissible other.

In the Australian case the notorious Dictation Test operated for decades by governments to justify the exclusion of unwanted applicants for immigration. The test was given in a language that was believed to be unfamiliar to the applicant to ensure failure. After the 1992 Mabo Case in the High Court of Australia overturned the legal fiction of *terra nullius* which had been the legal sanction for British dispossession of Indigenous Australians’ land, a totally different kind of language test was instituted. To demonstrate ongoing occupation of traditional lands, continuous language use in particular tribal areas was required. This connection of language and place therefore came to have very dramatic practical consequences.

**Multilingualism and place**

The pre-national state, as argued above, was diverse and pluralistic. The national state, as represented perhaps by Mr and Mrs Andrews, was much more uniform linguistically. Today we see conditions that recover some of the character of the pre-national state. The context of contemporary globalisation suggests to some the complete overcoming of the national state (Ohmae, 1995) and its replacement with regional economies (Thurow, 1992), or the end of ideological differences and the emergence of a seamless global view, indeed the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). Recent events give cause for much more caution and support Giddens’ (1999) idea that regionalisation, globalisation and localisation are co-occurring. However, some conditions of the emergence (in reality, the re-emergence) of supra-national structures do seem to mean that cities, regions and other natural zones of aggregation are becoming much more central in people’s identities and also more diverse, while still sharing common forms of communication (Schuck, 1998).

Immigration and population mobility generally under globalisation has certainly had this effect demographically. London’s bid to the International Olympic Committee to host the 2012 Olympic Games made loud claims that 300 languages are spoken there. This is of course facilitated by ICT which allows communication to be projected across vast spaces instantaneously, so the language-place connection is made more tenuous, but it is far from being weak. As a result cities and regions are being returned to the vastly multilingual conditions that prevailed before the rise of national states. If this does not mean the post-national state, it at least suggests that its exclusive sovereignty is waning.

We can see the effects of this most clearly in Europe. In 1992 the European Union and Council of Europe adopted the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. The Charter required national governments to recognise and support what came to be called autochthonous languages - languages of populations traditionally within the territory of national states. As a result, for the first time in centuries in some cases, there was practical and symbolic support for languages that the formation of national states had squeezed to the margins of society and to the edge of extinction.
These changes originated in supra-national structures, Brussels being less problematic to Catalans than Madrid.

Partly for this reason, though more because of internal dynamics also encouraged by the opening effects of globalisation and new citizenship rights (Jacobson, 1996; Janoski, 1998), national governments have conceded considerable space to regional languages. Catalan for example, has prospered in this new opening. In the UK there is considerable evidence of the same process, with the internal devolution produced by the New Labour government of Tony Blair in the late 1990s reinforcing the wider supra-national movement of support for minority languages and culture (Lo Bianco, 2001).

In parts of the world where national states came late, often as a result of de-colonisation, new states sometimes emulated European models with their stress on one nation-one language, when their populations were much more diverse than those of their colonisers. Even in classically or stereotypically monolingual and mono-cultural states, such as Japan (Maher, 2002) new discourses of plural self-definition can be identified. In Africa, Asia and across Latin America, where there is already much greater linguistic diversity than in Europe or Europeanised states, there is an intensification of diversity, through immigration bringing in new minority populations and though established communities making citizenship rights concessions to original minorities.

In all of these complex and long-ranging transformations, communication has been central. Most identities are communication-based, or at least linked to communication in some ways. Some use national languages in which whole communities are communication-based. The specific change is the widespread acceptance that languages can be functionally specialised. This means that some languages and cultural-identity formations are regarded as intra-group or identity-oriented, while others have a more instrumental or operational function. We can hear echoes in this of the ideas of Wierzbicka, who points to the lasting presence of culture in communication forms, and Holliday who wants to resist the power of this native speakerism to define who can “own” and belong to the English-speaking community. Under conditions of globalisation, vast populations have overlapping language competencies, and ideas of exclusive monolingualism in approved languages, the national states, language of required identity, have softened greatly.

Economic globalisation is accentuating this broader language effect by giving singular prestige to literate and schooled forms of English, meaning that it will form part of the linguistic repertoire of vast numbers of people in the world. This same globalisation has led to huge population mobility and the management of the newly diverse populations in education, or in learning communities, returns language to its prominent role of socialising minorities or marginalised populations into mainstream identities, except that these mainstream identities are now themselves also pluralising. We can see several trends, therefore, in relation to language and globalisation as they impact on identity and place:

1. Language and place are intimately connected and mutually-producing, e.g. in the very discourse of the formation of national states and localities, language is the medium though which this shared sense is produced and communicated (Fishman 1972), even if these are imagined communities (Anderson, 1991), in tribal and indigenous communities (Nettle and
Romaine, 2000; Singh and Scanlon, 2003) and even if the languages concerned are not distinctive or unique to the political communities concerned. This is clear within English, where attachments are transferred from a desire for a distinctive national language to a particular dialectal identity such as those that attach to US varieties of English, or to Australian, Nigerian or Indian ones (Baron, 1990; Mühlhäusler, 1995; Kirkpatrick, 2002).

2. Language is used multi-directionally for social capital, both as marker of inclusion and belonging, and as marker of exclusion. In nationalism language functions to mark authenticity of membership, non-sentimentally to provide efficiency and ideologically to forge unity across differences (Fishman, 1972). However language is also susceptible to manipulation so that ‘mother tongue’ or ‘native speaker’ ideologies and myths of belonging and uniqueness have explosive political histories. At their most extreme this can result in tests of belonging where the consequences for failure are execution or torture (McNamara and Roever, 2006) even for minor deviations of pronunciation. More organisationally this can give rise to mother tongue exclusivism with fascist and brutal consequences (Hutton, 1999). Less extremely, we can see how whole industries, such as the vast international TESOL industry, can be biased in favour of “natives” to their economic and career advantage (Holliday, 2005).

3. However, language is also very plastic and changeable. Dante Alighieri was able to forge a new language because he believed that Italian national unity would not be possible without it, so he wrote and forced the production of a new vernacular and invested it with cultural capital (Lo Bianco, 2005b). Centuries later his achievement, though modified several times, was a component in producing political unity. Even if it was ‘only’ an imagined community because few actually spoke this language, it still managed to persuade people of its sense of destiny. Language is therefore changeable. Changing language involves many forms of intervention. Some totally new, a priori, artificial languages can be called inventions. Many thousands of these have been created. More common are a posteriori languages, which begin with the raw material of existing languages and forge new forms. Many of today’s most prestigious “natural” languages, such as English, have been shaped and formed in this way. Languages can also be modified partially, so that some aspect is changed while the rest continues as before. This is most true of the writing systems, so critical to the effective functioning of education systems and economies, ICT, which are totally created entities and which are regularly modified.

4. Finally, we can distinguish between broad identification functions of language, agitational functions (nationalist or particularistic ones, such as gender neutral speech, which isn’t just neutral, but signals particular ideologies) and practical or instrumental ones. Different functions can come to the fore at different times under different conditions. Just because a more pragmatic age and sensibility seems to prevail at one time does not mean that the other functions have disappeared. For example, it isn’t only in developing nations, or post-
colonial settings, that language issues can become politically charged. An example is Sweden’s long-term acceptance of the use of English as the language of teaching in high level science and mathematics programs in its universities. However, when one of the consequences of this long-term use of English was exposed during the 1990s (the progressive deterioration of competence in Swedish in high level discourses, or domain collapse) the result was public alarm and agitation to bolster the position and security of Swedish as the national language with the full array of social and intellectual uses.

**National states in the global era**

For much of the time since the conclusion of World War II ‘modernists’ have had the upper hand in thinking about nations and nationalism. It seemed likely that cold war political alignments would bring about the predicted obsolescence of nationalism-based politics; the latter having exhausted itself in the war and the communist-capitalist world groupings. The latter part of the 20th century has shown a resilience and re-emergence of nationalist advocacy utilising language, ethnicity and religious markers of identification. Few scholars today would theorise the existence of national states entirely within modernist parameters any more; few would predict the withering away of the nation and few would predict that it could stay the same.

The modernisation school can no longer claim to prevail in thinking about the future of the nation. The reason for this change is the need to account for why there is resurgent nationalism at the same time as steady erosion of nationalist sentiment. Globalisation, regionalisation and localisation co-occur in complex interplay with no overarching or one-directional pattern. Indeed these patterns are interdependent, so that Globalisation is the reason for the revival of local identities in different parts of the world (Giddens 1999:12-13)

According to Benedict Anderson’s (1991) ‘anthropological spirit’ in examination of nationalism, the sustaining community of a nation is an ‘imagined’ one. Unlike traditional notions of community, based around daily enacted or reproduced acts of interdependence, the members of even small nations will never experience interpersonal intimacy with their national co-habitants. Their populations are too large, dispersed, busy or otherwise occupied, and yet such large collectivities live precisely as a community in what Anderson calls the “active imaginings” of its members. This idea that nations are made through acts of culture and imagination differs from the modernist-constructivist approach exemplified in the work of Hobsbawn (1993) and Gellner (1983). Anderson’s assertion of the ideational is a reaction against modernism's argument that nations are founded on ‘high literate culture’, industrial and post-industrial democracy, and advanced relations of industrial economy and technology.

In Anderson’s formulation, imagined collectivities don’t just imagine a nation, but a national state which contains a unity of deep, horizontal comradeship that permits the toleration of inequalities. Modernist views of national community as being based on conditions of possibility rendered by industrial modernity are to Anderson incapable of fully explaining the phenomenon of personal sacrifice that millions have endured (and have committed upon others) in the name of the nation. In his view we need to look to the ‘cultural roots of nationalism’ (Anderson 1991: 6-7).
Vernacular literature, used in cultural inculcation, functions to define and also to create the sense of continuity, using frequent reminders and associations, and a collection of narratives for national belonging. The utilisation of a vernacular literature is the most common element. According to Hastings (1997) the Bible - *Europe’s primary textbook* - constituted the vernacularised fundamental source of literary inculcation, later turned into a formal political philosophy. A common or shared language is the most powerful defining quality of an ethnicity. While an ethnicity may be a requirement of some nationalisms, and therefore of some nations, it is a critical function of the use of literacy and vernacular literature to create the intensified self-consciousness of nationalism. In its pursuit of control of territory and resources, and the establishment of a high culture and symbolic capital, a nation requires both political identity and considerable autonomy. Hence the nationalism links to state-politics.

A language which is the object of nationalist agitation tends to attract diverse material and symbolic associations. It can function to define a people’s ‘spirit’. A marked language can merely serve to define group boundaries in a less metaphysical notion of constituting an out-group with which the group in question contrasts itself (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1998). A marked language can in the sense used by Bhabha (1990) ‘narrate’ the nation to itself. In this sense it is both the content of the language (its literary and folk forms) that initially constitutes distinctiveness, and then in the hands of modernist nation-making policies can it form the raw material for high literary culture and ‘intellectualisation’ of the code.

Finally, nationalist discourse can appropriate a marked language as concrete evidence of authentic and continuous connection with the past, which in turn can give definition and shape to the politics of differentiation desired by its speakers or proponents. In this way both communicative and mobilising purposes are fulfilled by the language.

Where Gellner, the quintessential modernist, allocates centrality to economic progress as a core motivation of nationalism, other scholars identify in the past the motivating will for people’s engagement with nationalism. One of the staples in nationalism scholarship has been a distinction between civic and ethnic kinds of nationalism. Ethnic ideologies stress cultural similarity. Similarly, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents. An implication of both terms is the boundaries drawn vis-a-vis others constituted as outsiders. Hobsbawn (1993) and Gellner (1983) are modernists in that in their analyses of nationalism and nations they stress that the nation is neither a primary nor an *unchanging social entity*. They locate the nation exclusively in a particular, and historically recent, period. Indeed for Hobsbawn the national question *is situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation finding evidence in the claim that “standard national languages, spoken or written, cannot emerge as such before printing, mass literacy and hence, mass schooling.*

Not only are nations constructed, they are *constructed essentially from above* but cannot be understood without reference to the view from below, in the *assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist* (Hobsbawn *passim* 1993).

The era of globalisation has not made the nation-state and nationalism wither away. How is resurgent nationalism to be reconciled with the obvious process of globalisation? Smith (1995) synthesises three main views about nations and nationalism in the global era:
The transient nation

National feeling as an aberration: in addition to economic globalisation, other globally transforming phenomena are universal - sexual liberation, mass public media and mass international culture, instantaneous communications and technology. The internal multiculturalism of all societies heralds complete globalisation, a sort of transitional phase as the emergence of poly-ethnic societies brings on a poly-ethnic single world system.

The perennial nation

National feeling as primordial: the nation represents an attachment that cannot be transcended by economic or other developments. Nations are fundamental and essentialist, an irreplaceable structure of humanity.

The benign nation

Nations are necessary in the disruption, fragmentation and loss of identity that globalisation produces. Nations constitute a valuable sense of community against the disorienting and dislocating effects of hyper-modernity represented by globalisation. Destructive nationalism can be tempered by a rational state, but national feeling should be retained as an active effort of will and imagination.

The first view assumes that although under the pressures of economic globalisation some multilingualism may remain, it will be only a small number of dominant languages. This view sees languages as essentially about communication and not identity. Most languages will simply fade away, especially small languages. They will serve no purpose because communication will be more efficient in the highly developed languages of modernity and science. People will mainly find identity and meaning around personal, professional or economic interests, not ethnic, national or linguistic attachments. Languages are, by this approach, distractions, remnants of past times when wider communication systems did not exist.

The second view requires the continuation of vibrant community institutions to bolster diversity, vibrant ethnic or national networks all using their own languages. However, states may still be characterised by nationality or by dominant single nationalities but will probably be very linguistically and culturally diverse as well. Many who hold this view argue that such states need defending. They see threats from two sources. The first is cultural: the homogenising tendencies of economic globalisation. Popular culture threatens to turn all nation-states into facsimiles of Hollywood, of capitalist individualism and of rampant consumerism. The second threat to the benign, mild nation-state is the forces of extreme nationalism that are on the rise in much of the world today.

The first view is essentially economistic and looks at society as an economy first and foremost. The second view of nationality stresses society as an expression of culture, rather than a reflection of economics. The first is competition-oriented (the strong prevail over the weak) or meritocratic, the more talented, skilled, educated or able get more. It tends towards
determinism: there is little we can do to change the direction of globalisation; economics and technology drive the future. The second view of nationality involves the possibility that we can intervene, we can resist economic forces, and structure social futures around ideals of community, sociality and human difference within shared political and economic frameworks. It pragmatically accepts that mild nationality is desirable, but not inevitable, and advocates its defence.

The third believes that nations are primordial, that we are what we were born, and that the world is irretrievably and permanently divided into nationalities. If the first is about economy, the second about society and culture, the third is mainly about the fixedness of race and ethnicity.

Diversity Everywhere

Most nation states today are more diverse and plural in culture and language than the 'unity' stories they tell themselves would admit. Few have borders that are totally uncontested, and none has an economy quarantined totally from outsiders.

At no stage in history has the population diversity of nations been so great. World population movements are greater than at any previous stage in history (Castles and Miller 1997). The poor and the displaced move across borders in increasing numbers, as do the rich and powerful. Recruited labour migration goes to countries of former emigration (Greece, Italy, Japan), countries of immigration also host massive out movements of people (USA, Canada and Germany); student mobility is vast in a globally connected education marketplace, and the movement of elites in vast numbers gives rise to hybridising cultures everywhere and huge diversity of norms of communication.

Globalisation is making nations porous. The boundaries are being permeated and the content is being transformed. The nation (as state) claimed control over its people's language, culture, the national territory and the national economy. Standard languages were invented by academies well before most nation states came into existence, but it was nations which had become states that invented national languages, and mass standard language literacy.

Being a citizen

Two basic kinds of citizenship are contrasted to an emerging global citizenship model. The first is based on blood and ancestry as the marker of belonging, the second is the political community model. Blood and ancestry attachments always make use of certain cultural and linguistic behaviours as well. The other model of citizenship is a rights and duties model which derives political attachment to a state. At least in the West this was inaugurated by Ancient Rome in its notion of civis Romanus. Newcomers can belong as long as they dedicate themselves to the duties and fulfilling the expectations of the state, and in return receive protections and other benefits.

While blood and ancestry models make it hard for outsiders to belong, rights and duties approaches may admit outsiders but not necessarily welcome their language and cultural differences. Indeed, in some kinds of political community models, where equality is identified with being the same, there can be great intolerance of differences of language and culture. In
both cases, also, there is often a huge divide between the ideal of citizenship as expressed in law and formal procedures, and the reality of equal participation, or what is here called substantive citizenship.

The Canadian constitutional scholar James Tully (1997) argues that in this ‘age of diversity’ constitutionality and citizenship challenge all past constitutional practice. This enshrines the idea of a cultural communion between rulers and ruled, jointly citizens of a nation. It argues that the state is also a nation, a horizontal affiliation of attachment, behaviour, commonalities, and that these kinds of unity underlie the state.

According to Tully, the nation:

... engenders a sense of belonging and allegiance by means of the nation’s individual name, national historical narrative and public symbols. By naming the constitutional association and giving it a historical narrative, the nation and its citizens, who take on its name when they become its citizens, possess a corporate identity or personality (Tully 1997: 68).

In this respect, belonging to a state as a citizen involves more than formal attachment, but also knowledge, skills and capabilities that will make it possible to have ‘substantive’ citizenship. And this kind of citizenship is one that most nation states have not yet achieved for large numbers of their members. Public education cannot inculcate a particular religious doctrine; it still reflects culturally sanctioned choices regarding moral values.

The global moment, especially as represented in population mobility, is evident in relation to the curricula objectives of schooling which oscillate between ideals of providing an education that preserves society’s unity as against pressures to make available an education that respects and supports its diversity (Dauenhauer 1996: 147).

New citizenship issues apply to children and to adult new arrivals. Globalisation has produced increasingly fluid and multiple identities. The vast international movement of peoples under globalisation has made citizenship status an area of contention and debate. Formal (legal) citizenship may include evidence of the adult new arrival’s ability in the national/official language, and is usually defined and conferred by a national authority. This kind of citizenship is undifferentiated, i.e. it applies to all equally. In reality, however, substantive (participatory) citizenship concerns the skills, knowledge and capabilities of citizens to access, enact or participate in activating or claiming citizenship rights and fulfilling their citizenship duties. This normative citizenship challenges states to ensure that the language for public participation is available widely. Language here refers to much more than the national official language. It includes the kind of literate and articulate registers of language that make possible, or hinder, public access to information and knowledge that is required for citizenship of an active kind.

The effects of globalisation also bring to the surface tensions in law as well around the sovereign rights and limits of nations as well as challenges in education. There is conflict between universally claimed human rights and the claim that nation-states make as sovereign entities to be able to determine who is permitted to live in the state, and who is granted citizenship, under what conditions. In this way:
Citizenship and naturalization claims of foreigners, denizens, and residents within the borders of a polity, as well as the laws, norms, and rules governing such procedures are pivotal social practices through which the normative perplexities of human rights and sovereignty can be most acutely observed (Benhabib 1999: 710, 1997: 711).

Advocates of pluralism must identify and engage with relevant national and local patterns of educational decision-making, each with their particular dimensions of complexity and specificity, where complex or differentiated citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995, Dauenhauer, 1996,) challenges traditional and secure notions of citizenship.

The plural state can be defended by an economic, a technical or a moral discourse. The economic argument holds that more knowledge and skill is better than less, it utilises human capital asset thinking because it offers the potential to express what people know as a concrete asset for the benefit of society. The technical discourse is amply shown by research on the meta-linguistic cognitive and other benefits of bilingual capacity. The moral discourse we can identify as concerned with the rights and entitlements of minorities, and with ideals of justice and reparation for past linguistic and cultural assimilation.

These kinds of pluralism make possible substantive citizenship, the kind of citizenship that allows the full exercise of rights, with recognition that difference is inevitable and legitimate. Political community and constitutionality are the guarantees of commonality.

**Human Capital**

The OECD defines human capital as: The knowledge that individuals acquire during their life and use to produce goods and services or ideas in market and non-market circumstances (OECD 1997: 17). One the main exponents of this approach to knowledge, knowledge as an economic category, is F. Machlup, through his 1984 three volume work: Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution, and Economic Significance.

The connection between knowledge and human capital is easily understood if one realizes that capital is formed by investment, that investment in human resources is designed to increase their capacity (to produce, to earn, to enjoy life etc), and that improvements of capacity, as a rule, result from the acquisition of ‘knowing what’ and ‘knowing how’ (Machlup 1984: 8). For Machlup three ‘knowledge stocks’ are available for economies to draw on in producing capital, knowledge embodied in individual physical tools, knowledge embodied in individual persons, specially trained ‘knowledge carriers’ and non-embodied knowledge. Aggregating these produces a sum of the knowledge capital available to the economy.

This focus on the economic role of knowledge seeks to make ‘invisible’ capital (human beings and their knowledge) visible to the gaze of accountants and economists. The economic role of knowledge is seen to be critical in the post-industrial economy (services, high technology products, value-added processes, tourism). In addition, this approach aims to create an open ‘market for the exchange of competence’. In such a market individuals operate like micro-economies, investing in their skills and knowledge and ‘trading themselves.’
This vision is of a kind of universe as an interconnected economy of rational people making cost-benefit assessments of the returns for investment costs in all areas of their lives; including the languages they speak and the cultures they can competently function in. The particular take on globalisation that the OECD adopts reveals its commitment to human capital: *Globalisation has become the dominant trend in the world economy…dynamic and emerging market economies are 'linking' themselves to the global economy through trade, capital flows and technology exchanges* (OECD 1997: 3, also OECD 1998).

Working within these parameters the OECD sees two trends as dominating in industrialised economies since the late 1970s in relation to human capital, first the vast increase in investments in science and technology, in turn fuelling expansions in the stock of human knowledge, and second, change in the relative proportion of investment between physical assets and intangible assets, mainly humans.

In some ways multilingualism is actually favoured by these trends of globalisation and human capital, so long as shared forms of communication are retained. Under the OECD vision of globalisation, competitive advantage rests with those able to understand market and consumer needs, tastes, preferences, style changes and disposable income and expenditure patterns. This kind of intimate knowledge that a seller needs of his or her potential buyers comes from direct encounters with them, usually best attained in the first language. In addition, some of the biggest industries in today’s economy are directly intimate, such as the requirement for individual customer satisfaction in the world’s largest industry - tourism. Knowing directly (i.e. without mediation), and intimately, potential customers is an aspect of the contemporary economic reality that elevates the need for language and cultural capabilities.

Progressively, all parts of the world are being incorporated into relations of economy that are based on market rationality. As this wider rationality is applied to individuals and education systems we find the space for distinctive worlds represented by societies characterised by pre-industrial, agrarian or hunter-gatherer systems of economy being eroded and replaced. As a result these languages are dying.

**Collapse of micro languages**

The collapse in these distinctive societal bases leads to the collapse in the linguistic systems that give life to these societies (Nettle and Romaine 2000). This contraction of distinctive and pre-industrial society environments occurs at the same time as a proliferation of new kinds of hybrid cultural practices and languages (the many Englishes of the world, the varieties of French, Spanish, Chinese etc that arise in the wake of contact with strong need to communicate in dominated areas), and also at the same time that some cultures assert local identity in reaction against globalisation. These contradictory patterns are all-simultaneous and create each other in a vast dynamic of rapid and historically specific instances which make opposite results emerge from the same ingredients in different parts of the globe.

One is the pessimistic belief that globalisation often means cultural homogenisation, loss of distinctiveness, and rampant substitution of unique social and mental worlds with uniform patterns of consumerist commonality. How serious such a risk is can be noted by the calculation in 1992 by Unesco in its Red Book on Endangered Languages that 90% of the
presently spoken 6,000 languages in the world are threatened with extinction within two
generations. An opposing reading is more optimistic. While language attrition is undeniable and
the contraction of the vitality of many of the world’s distinctive cultures is clearly happening
some see in globalisation a moment of new kinds of hybridity of language and culture, the
emergence of multicultural societies everywhere, vast population mobility, ever more
diversifying codes of communication, and ‘micro-cultures’ of Internet-mediated identity.

Visiting the Andrews

What place can there be, then, for languages, which at the same time according to Wierzbicka
retain the cultural residues of an originating Anglo context, even when the language leaves
home and lodges into the lives of millions of people far away? How do we reconcile the fact that
English is global and also local? Some trends in the global economy clearly favour
multilingualism. There is also increased commitment to languages as social capital in the
multiculturalism of modern cities and regions, so that most communities use languages that
have homelands and Diasporas. English is just like this too, so that its old native speaker
varieties nourish identity and attachment, while new varieties increasingly do so also, even as
the particular cultures they carry are radically different from that of Mr and Mrs Andrews.

To reconcile these divergent tendencies it is useful to distinguish the resources available in
language from what speakers do with these resources, essentially between linguistic signifiers
and the signs that users make of the code they are working with. Another way to express this
idea is to say that language differs from discourse. While the words, grammar and modes of use
of English are still inflected by the original shapers of the language, these function as resources
put to use to serve different needs and to solve different problems in the many settings where
English is set to work to deliver education in Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur and Cape Town. What is
done with language, in speech action, is a realm of situated meanings (Bourdieu, 1991,
Hanks, 1996), and this is the experience that most people have of communication.

The language and its original designers make available, or offer, meaning potentials, but the
actual concrete uses are in the broad control of its speakers, who mix the meaning potentials
with cultural and pragmatic norms drawn from local settings, local semiotic resources and
practical communication needs. Some potentials are suggested by the culture that resides in
English, as depicted in the idyll created by Gainsborough and uncovered in the research
conducted by Wierzbicka, but they are realised and transformed locally.
References


